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BRINGING FAIRNESS TO THE COSTS
SYSTEM - AN INDEMNITY SCHEME FOR
THE COSTS OF SUCCESSFUL APPEALS
AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS
By GARRY D. WATSON* and PAUL LANTZ**
"[A] suitor ought not to pay for the errors of a judge" per Mellish L.J. (Denny
v. Hancock (1870), 40 L.J. Ch. 193 at 194.)
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the cost indemnity principle followed in Canada and other Com-
monwealth countries an unsuccessful litigant will normally be ordered to pay
the costs of the successful litigant. Thus, if A sues B and is successful at
trial, B will typically be ordered to pay A's costs. The rationale is that B's
conduct, in resisting A's claim, necessitates the law suit; therefore, he should
bear the costs. But what if B appeals, is successful and the trial judgment is
reversed? Typically A is ordered to pay B's costs throughout-of both the
trial and the appeal. How do we justify placing liability for the costs of
both the trial and the appeal on A? Bringing the ultimately unfounded
litigation and necessitating the trial was A's "fault," but the second hearing
-the appeal-may now be viewed as the result of error1 of the trial judge,
not of A. The simple answer is that we cannot fairly justify placing this
liability on A. As Mellish L.J. said as early as 1870, "[A] suitor ought not
to pay for the errors of a judge."
The recognition that the cost indemnity principle may operate quite
© Copyright, 1981, Garry D. Watson and Paul Lantz.
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
* Of the Ontario Bar.
1 It does not follow that, because he was reversed on appeal, the trial judge was in
fact necessarily at fault or in error. On the existing state of the authorities he may
have come to the only conclusion open to him. The point in such cases is that the
litigant should not have to pay for the uncertainty of the law and for the making of
new law at the appellate level.
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unfairly in certain circumstances has led several Australian jurisdictions to
enact legislation giving effect to the philosophy that:
... a citizen is entitled to a correct decision from the court to which he first
comes or is brought. If through some error of law on the part of the court, or
through some shortcoming in the legal system or some chance happening not
attributable to fault on his part, he does not get what is due to him, then he
should be entitled to be paid the cost of getting the correct decision or of other-
wise having the matter put right.2
This paper proposes a scheme for indemnifying parties against certain
costs that may be incurred in civil litigation which it is not just and reason-
able to expect them to bear. The proposal builds on the legislative schemes
developed in Australia and adapts them, with a variety of modifications, to
the Canadian context. The proposed scheme is embodied in a draft Act de-
signed as a model statute suitable for enactment, with some modifications, in
any province. (See Appendix.) The scheme and the draft Act are discussed
in detail, below. It will, however, be useful to first summarize the key fea-
tures of the scheme.
The basis of the scheme is a "litigant's indemnity fund" [hereinafter
referred to as the "Fund"]. This Fund could be financed out of Consolidated
Revenue but, as explained below, our proposal is that it be financed by
contributions .from litigants, collected by means of a modest increase in
court filing fees. The Fund would be used to indemnify parties for certain
legal costs which are directly traceable, not to their own fault, but to court
malfunctioning. Indemnification would be available in three types of situa-
tions. The first, and by far the most important situation, is that of costs in-
curred in respect of a successful appeal. In such cases each party would
usually receive from the Fund the amount of their taxed party and party
costs of the appeal. The second concerns the costs of abortive proceedings:
for example, where a judge dies before delivering judgment. Here, if a new
trial takes place the Fund would cover the party and party costs of the
original trial "thrown away" as a result of the death of the judge. The third
situation relates to costs incurred where a judge refuses to approve an infant
settlement (or the settlement of a claim by any other party under disability)
and the party fails to recover more at trial.
The level of indemnity provided by the scheme would be the same as
that which a successful party would usually receive from a losing party, that
is, party and party costs. 3 The Act does not provide for the payment of the
2 Winneke, An Indemnity for the Cost of Litigation (1964), 5 Aust. Law. 161 at 162.
3 Fixing the maximum level of indemnity at party and party costs, see draft Act,
s. 6(2), would mean that the actual impact of the proposed scheme would vary depend-
ing on the relationship, in any given province, between such costs and solicitor and
client costs. In Ontario party and party costs tend to be about two thirds of solicitor
and client costs and hence an order against the Fund would give a party substantial
financial relief. However, this would not be so in provinces where the degree of in-
dennity provided by party and party costs is much lower, for example, see the com-
ment of Bouck J. in McGrath v. Goldman (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 305 at 314, [1976]
1 W.W.R. 743 at 753 (B.C.S.C.) to the effect that in British Columbia party and party
costs provide on the average only a thirty percent indemnity. In provinces where the
degree of indemnity provided by party and party costs is this low it would be unwise-
if the proposed scheme is to provide litigants any significant relief-to limit costs re-
coverable against the fund to party and party costs.
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full indemnity of solicitor and client costs. While it may seem that ideally
a party should be fully compensated for costs incurred as a result of court
malfunctioning, there are factors weighing against this. The scheme is de-
signed as a supplement to, not as a general reformation of, the law of costs.
By that law parties normally receive only party and party costs. Were the
scheme to provide for solicitor and client costs, parties would be better off
financially if the system malfunctioned than if it were to perform properly.
Costs on the higher scale might even encourage appeals.
II. HISTORY
Cost indemnity schemes have been developed in a number of Austra-
lian states during the last three decades. The first, in 1951, was the New
South Wales Suitor's Fund Act.4 Four other states now have operating
schemes5 and a sixth state, South Australia, has enacted a scheme which has
not yet been proclaimed.0
The original New South Wales Act applied only to appeals and then
only to appeals on questions of law. Since its enactment it has been amended
to cover additional matters, including abortive proceedings and new trials
ordered on the grounds that damages were excessive or inadequate.7 Other
Australian statutes have also been extended to cover more types of proceed-
4 Suitors' Fund Act, 1951 (No. 3 of 1951, N.S.W.).
The following is a list of published articles and reports dealing with the Australian
schemes. Note, Suitors' Fund Act (1956), 30 Aust. L.J. 117 (discussion of problems
with N.S.W. legislation, constitutional cases and statistics); Note, An Indemnity for the
Cost of Litigation (1959), 33 Aust. L.J. 289; Jeffrey, The Suitors' Fund Act, 1951-
1959 (N.S.W.) (1959), 33 Aust. L.J. 306 (discussion of amendments to the Act, prob-
lems remaining and brief review of constitutional decisions); Winnecke, An Indemnity
for the Cost of Litigation (1964), 5 Aust. Law. 161 (discussion of the Victorian
Appeal Costs Fund Act of 1964, comparison with N.S.W. legislation); Misra, An In-
demnity for the Cost of Litigation in Australia (1965), 14 I.C. L.Q. 692 (brief discus-
sion of N.S.W. and Victorian legislation on appeal costs); Law Reform Committee of
South Australia, Relating to The Enactment of an Appeal Costs Fund Act (Adelaide:
Gov't Printer, 1974) (consideration of Tasmanian Act and changes necessary to adapt
it to South Australia); Note, Appeal Costs Fund Act 1964 (1975), 49 Law Inst. J.
470 (procedure for making applications under the Victorian legislation, problems being
experienced by the Appeal Costs Board); Law Reform Commission of Western Austra-
lia, Report on the Suitors Fund Act, Part A: Civil Proceedings (Perth: Law Reform
Comm'n, 1976) (discussion of deficiencies in then current legislation, comparison to
legislation in other Australian states); Law Reform Commission of Western Australia,
Report on the Suitors' Fund Act, Part B: Criminal Proceedings (Perth: Law Reform
Comm'n, 1977) (recommended that Suitors' Fund Act no longer apply to criminal
proceedings, discussion of other legislation applicable to criminal proceedings and
recommendations for extensions thereto, criminal costs legislation in Australia, New
Zealand and England); White, Orders As to Costs-A Note (1979), 5 Queensland Law. 46
(suggests that courts should be more generous in the application of the Queensland
Appeal Costs Fund Act.
5 Appeal Costs Fund Act (No. 7165 of 1964, Victoria); Suitors' Fund Act, 1964
(Australia); Appeal Costs Fund Act (No. 57 of 1968, Tasmania); Appeal Costs Fund
Act (No. 51 of 1973, Queensland).
0Appeal Costs Fund Act, 1979 (No. 33 of 1979, South Australia). Subsequent
references to these Australian statutes will be by reference to the state names only, as
abbreviated.
7 Suitors' Fund (Amendment) Act, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959, N.S.W.), s. 3(b).
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ings, including compromises of actions by infants and persons under dis-
ability.8 All of the Australian schemes are funded by contributions from
litigants.
Two Ontario bodies have recommended the adoption of schemes to
provide for the payment of appeal costs. The McRuer Commission on Civil
Rights suggested that the Court of Appeal should have the power to order
that the costs of an appeal be met by the government if the appeal was nec-
essitated by judicial misconduct or error.9 The Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission recommended that the government should, in some cases, indemnify
litigants involved in successful appeals. The Court of Appeal and the Divi-
sional Court would be given the power to order such an indemnification.1"
The Commission based its recommendation on the fact that under current
practice the litigants bear the expense of an error made by the court, an
institution of government, when an appeal is successful. Both the McRuer
Commission and the Law Reform Commission proposals involved the use of
public funds as opposed to an insurance scheme funded by contributions
from litigants.
The scheme proposed in this paper is narrower than the Australian
scheme in that it does not extend to criminal proceedings. It does, however
provide somewhat broader coverage to civil litigants.
III. FUNDING
Two methods of funding the scheme are readily apparent-direct fund-
ing by the government out of general revenue or contributions from litigants.
Arguably, the ideal method of funding would have the state bear the
expense out of general revenue." Since the scheme is one directed at reliev-
ing litigants from expenses resulting from the malfunctioning of the courts,
an institution of government, it may be said that the state should pay. Prag-
matically, however, this solution is in conflict with governmental reluctance
to incur new additional expense in times of restraint. A scheme so funded
would run a real risk of never being implemented. As already indicated,
none of the Australian schemes is directly government funded, but instead
all rely on compulsory contributions from litigants. This is also the method
proposed for the scheme discussed here where the contributions would take
the form of a modest increase in court filing fees. Thus the scheme is one
of compulsory insurance for litigants. The principal advantage of this ap-
proach is that it would not increase net governmental expenditures, therefore
removing a major political barrier to its implementation.'12 But once the
8 See, e.g., Suitors' Fund Amendment Act, 1978 (No. 37 of 1978, W. Aust.), s. 2.
9 Ont., 4 Second Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Civil Rights
(McRuer Report) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 1405.
10 Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1 Report on the Administration of Ontario
Courts (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1973) at 240.
11 But see comment note 12, infra.
12 Arguably, this may be its only advantage. However, since the source of most
of the general revenue is from taxation of various kinds, it can be argued that, notwith-
standing that an institution of government is at fault, it is fairer to the non-litigating
public that the Fund be financed only out of a "tax" on those who may benefit from
the scheme, that is, litigants.
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scheme is framed as one of compulsory insurance (as opposed to state in-
demnification), can it be justified? Imposing a compulsory insurance scheme
on litigants raises the question: if litigants are concerned about this risk,
why has a private insurance market not developed to meet this need? The
answer appears to be twofold. First, the risk is not one that is usually per-
ceived in advance and the desirability of insuring against it only becomes
apparent when the resulting costs are incurred. 13 This is related to the fact
that since litigation is largely an unplanned and non-recurring activity, there
are few institutional litigants and hence there is no recurring consumer
group. Moreover, the particular risk of court system malfunction is almost
certainly not one that is regularly brought to the attention of litigants by
their legal advisers at the outset of litigation. Second, the transaction costs
involved in the marketing of private, voluntary insurance of this kind would
be substantial, resulting in high premiums which would likely make such
private insurance unattractive to even informed litigants who perceived the
need for it.14
In contrast, the transaction costs of "marketing" a government-run
compulsory insurance scheme would be minimal, resulting in the possibility
of very modest "premiums."' 5 Already existing court fee collection systems
could be used to raise the funding; by simply raising the fees payable in each
court by a specified percentage, the marginal increase in existing transaction
costs would be negligible. All that would be involved is a quarterly or an-
nual book transfer of an amount to the Fund.
Ideally the amount of contribution each class of litigants should pay
would depend upon the likelihood of their incurring the risk insured against
(for example, a successful appeal) and the amount they would be entitled to
claim against the Fund in such circumstances. Since the risk and cost of a
successful appeal would be much greater in respect of superior court actions
than small claims court proceedings, the contribution per litigant should be
greater in the superior court than in the small claims court. The concept of
basing contribution on risk could be extended beyond merely varying the
contribution from court to court. If it could be shown that a particular type
of case were very likely to result in an appeal (for example, a personal in-
jury action) then the amount levied in respect of such an action could be
more than the amount for other types of cases. But obviously the benefit of
differential contributions, that is, fairness, is rather quickly outweighed by
13 There is one type of malfunction covered by the scheme where private insurance
has played a role-where a judge dies before delivering judgment. Though rare, it is
not unheard of for parties to take out insurance on the life of the judge in cases where
a very lengthy trial is anticipated and his mid-trial death would be financially ruinous
for the parties in terms of wasted counsel fees. For a recent account of this practice
see Strauss, "Policy on judge used as insurance in long court fights", The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Nov. 23, 1981 at A-5, col. 1.
14 It is interesting to note that where private insurance has played a role, see id.,
it is in the form of life insurance for which there is an already established market.
15 There will be transaction costs associated with claims adjustment, that is, ad-
ministrative costs in the Accountant's office and some limited judicial time spent on
adjudicating entitlement, but these costs should be modest.
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the added costs of identifying various types of cases and collecting differen-
tial amounts for different types of cases. Almost certainly, however, cases
that go to trial are much more risk prone in terms of appeals. Consequently,
in those courts which levy a fee for setting cases down for trial, "loading"
the levy more heavily into this aspect of the fee structure would seem ap-
propriate.
With a scheme financed by contributions from the litigant-benefi-
ciaries the question of funding and coverage becomes closely interrelated, at
least if the idea that only those classes of litigants who have contributed
should receive benefits is adhered to. Problems arise, for example, with re-
gard to courts that do not collect fees from their users. The collection of
contributions from litigants in such courts can be a nuisance, may involve
substantial increased expense and may run counter to a government policy
of free access to the court, for example, family court. A doctrinaire ap-
proach would be to say that if litigants in such a court do not make con-
tributions, they should be excluded from coverage. A preferable approach
would be to have the government make direct contribution to the Fund in
respect of such courts, in lieu of direct user contributions, or to simply in-
clude such courts within the scheme even though there is no user contribu-
tion. With an isolated instance such as the family court, either approach
would be tolerable. However, the problem becomes more acute if proceed-
ings before, or originating with, administrative tribunals are to be brought
within the scheme. Fairness and the solvency of the Fund might necessitate
the imposition of a levy by those tribunals that do not impose fees if their
users are to participate in the scheme.
The approach adopted in the draft Act follows the example of most of
the Australian schemes and abandons any direct relationship between con-
tributing to, and benefiting from, the scheme. The Fund would be financed
by transferring a certain percentage of all court fees to the Fund", with ap-
propriate increases in relevant court fees being made to generate the new
funds. The list of eligible proceedings has been developed without direct ref-
erence to whether all who may benefit have in fact contributed, and the




The cost indemnity scheme is limited to civil proceedings. This is note-
worthy, since the Australian schemes often apply to both civil and criminal
proceedings. The scheme proposed here is not particularly appropriate for
implementation in criminal proceedings. While indemnity for costs in civil
cases is well-established, in Canada there is no general principle of cost in-
O61Draft Act, s. 2(5).
1 Since the definition of "courts" in s. 1(b) does not include administrative tri-
bunals, successful "first level" appeals from such tribunals would not be covered. On
this point see text at note 26, infra.
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demnity in criminal cases and the law of costs in such cases is neither well-
defined' 8 nor extensive in its application. 19
Several Australian states have, in addition to the litigation indemnity
schemes of the type proposed here, criminal costs statutes specifically di-
rected at assisting or indemnifying acquitted persons.20 Similar legislation
exists in England2' and New Zealand.2 Although the Australian litigation
indemnity schemes often extend their coverage to criminal proceedings, the
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia has pointed out that this is
illogical. It recommended rationalization by transferring all provisions re-
lating to criminal proceedings from the litigation indemnity scheme to its
criminal costs statute.2 3 It pointed out that the litigation insurance scheme
was not an appropriate means of providing compensation in criminal cases,
because it was a contributory scheme and convicted persons should not, and
were not, required to make contributions.
2 4
In addition to not extending to criminal proceedings, the proposed
scheme is limited to proceedings in courts as opposed to administrative tri-
bunals. The courts to which it applies are enumerated in an inclusive list.25
By restricting the scheme's coverage to court proceedings, where a sta-
tutory appeal taken from an administrative tribunal succeeds, no appeal costs
benefits under the draft Act will be payable in respect of the first appellate
court level.26 Administrative tribunal proceedings are not excluded from the
scheme as a matter of principle; indeed there is no reason why they could
not be included, providing the parties were required-at the tribunal level-
to contribute to the Fund. They are excluded under the draft Act until more
experience can be obtained in the operation of the scheme in the pure court
context.
18 Law Reform Commission of Canada, A Proposal for Costs in Criminal Cases
(Ottawa, 1973) at 2.
'9 Sharp, Costs on Acquittal (1968), 16 Chitty's L.J. 77 at 81.
20 See, e.g., Official Prosecution (Defendants' Costs) Act, 1973 (No. 46 of 1973,
W. Aust.).
21 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973, c. 14 (U.K.).
22 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (No. 129 of 1967, N.Z.).
23 Law Reform Comm'n of W. Aust. Report, Part B, supra note 4, at 48.
24 Id. at 6. If the scheme proposed here were to be funded out of general revenue
there would be little objection to extending it to criminal proceedings. However, in
respect of criminal proceedings the more urgent need is for the adoption of a general
rule that acquitted persons should be paid their defence costs by the state.
25 Draft Act, s. 1 (b). The failure of some Australian states to set out inclusive lists
has resulted in needless litigation as to whether a particular body is or is not covered
by the statute. See, e.g., Gosford Shire Council v. Anthony George Pty. Ltd., [1969]
1 N.S.W.R. 59, (1968), 89 W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 350 (Land & Valuation Ct.);
Builders Licencing Ed. v. Pride Constructions Pty. Ltd., [1979] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 607 (Com.
L. Div.).
26 This is because, under the draft Act, the costs of a successful appeal are payable
out of the Fund where the appeal is from "a court"; s. 3(1). However, if there is a
further appeal and it succeeds, cost benefits would be payable since the situation would
now be one of a successful appeal'from "a court".
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B. Successful Appeals
The major coverage under the proposed scheme deals with successful
appeals, since they are considerably more common than abortive proceed-
ings or unapproved settlement cases. Where an appeal from a court succeeds
in whole or in part, the court 7 may make an order against the Fund in fa-
vour of any party to the proceeding, with respect to the costs of the appeal
and any further court proceedings ordered by the appellate court, "2 for ex-
ample, a new trial. Under the draft Act, the court's power to make an order
applies to all appeals that succeed; there is no requirement, for example,
that the appeal concern a question of law only. By contrast the Australian
statutes limit the types of appeals in which compensation is payable to ap-
peals which succeed on questions of law (in all states), 20 appeals on the
quantum of damages (in all states except South Australia) 0 and appeals on
the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the evidence (in Queens-
land and Victoria only).31 The limitation to appeals on matters of law only
has attracted criticism in Australia. In 1974, for example, the South Austra-
lian Law Reform Committee recommended that appeals on mixed questions
of fact and law be covered; in 1976, the Law Reform Commission of
Western Australia recommended that the limitation to appeals on questions
of law be removed.32 The basis for the limitation to appeals which succeed
on questions of law is unclear. Chief Justice Burbury of Tasmania com-
mented:
As there is also a risk common to all litigants that a court may err on questions
of fact, it is perhaps anomalous that the provisions of the Act do not extend to
all appeals. A layman might be forgiven for failing to understand why he should
be indemnified against costs occasioned by mistakes made by judges and magis-
trates on questions of law but not on questions of fact
33
27 As to who may make the order where the appellate court is the Supreme Court
of Canada, see text accompanying notes 62-67, infra.
28 Draft Act, s. 3(1) and s. 3(5).
Where a new trial takes place after an abortive proceeding the parties will recover
from the Fund the costs of the initial abortive trial: see text accompanying note 43,
infra. However, where a new trial is ordered after an appeal the situation is different.
Section 3(5) of the draft Act provides that at the new trial the court may award the
parties the costs of the new or the old trial, whichever is less. The reason is that a new
trial after an appeal, because it may be on a limited question (for example, the quantum
of damages), may be much shorter than the original trial, in which case the parties
should only have the costs of the new trial from the Fund. It would be unsound to
permit the court to order the costs of the new trial simpliciter against the Fund, since
the parties then would knowingly be litigating at the expense of the Fund.
29 W. Aust., s. 10; Tas., s. 8; S. Aust. s. 7; Q'Id., s. 15; Vic., s. 13; N.S.W., s. 6.
3o W. Aust., s. 15; Tas., s. 16; Q'Id., s. 23; Vic., s. 19; N.S.W., s. 6B.
31 Vic., s. 19; Q'Id., s. 23.
32 See Law Reform Comm. of S. Aust., supra note 4, at 4; Law Reform Comm'n
of W. Aust., Report, Part A, supra note 4, at 10. However, in neither of these states
have these recommendations been implemented, notwithstanding that in Western Austra-
lia all the bodies who commented on the Commission's report, including the Law
Society of Western Australia, supported the recommendation.
33 Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd. v. Woodhall Ltd., [1972] Tas. S.R. 41
at 43 (S. Ct. Full Ct.).
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Another judge, Mr. Justice Moffitt of New South Wales, suggested that the
limitation may be related to the fact that where a decision is reversed for
reasons other than an error of law, the initial decision may be traceable to
the conduct of a party or his lawyer.34 As a general proposition this state-
ment is open to question. In any event, the solution is not a blanket prohibi-
tion on granting cost compensation to certain classes of cases. The preferable
approach, adopted in the draft Act, is to give the court a general discretion
and to permit it to take into account, where relevant, any fault attributable
to the parties.35
Following the example of the general law of costs, the draft Act stresses
the court's discretion. In no circumstances does a party have an absolute
right to costs against the Fund. With regard to all eligible proceedings, the
court has a discretion whether it should make an order against the Fund,86
and in whose favour it should be made. 7 Moreover, it may order that a
party recover only part of his costs3 8 and it may take into account, where
relevant, the conduct of the parties and their lawyers.S9
It may be useful at this point to follow a typical case through an ap-
peal to illustrate the impact of the scheme on the overall costs of the parties.
The example below relates to an appeal from a trial judge, however, the
proposed scheme would apply to all successful appeals from a court whether
the judgment appealed was interlocutory or final.
Plaintiff v. Defendant is an action tried in a superior court. Plaintiff is
successful at trial and is given judgment for $30,000 with costs. Let us as-
sume that in conducting the action each party incurs legal expenses (fees
and disbursements) totalling $4,000 and that the party and party costs re-
coverable by the successful party are taxed at $3,000.
Situation after Trial
Own Costs Costs Paid Costs Received Net Costs
Plaintiff $4,000 - $3,000 $1,000
Defendant 4,000 $3,000 - 7,000
If Defendant's appeal is unsuccessful, under current practice Defendant
will be responsible for all his costs (of both the trial and appeal), and he
will normally be ordered to pay Plaintiff's party and party costs of both the
34 Acquilina v. Dairy Farmers Co-op. Milk Co., [1965] N.S.W.R. 772 at 774, 82
W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 531 at 533 (S. Ct).
s5 How the court might" deal with the problem of what weight to give lawyer or
party misconduct is discussed in text accompanying notes 72-74, infra.
36 See draft Act s. 3(1), s. 4(1), s. 5 and s. 6(3). This is also the case in all the
Australian states with regard to successful appeals on questions of law. In some states,
however, a party has a right to costs out of the fund in other cases, for example, in
abortive proceedings (e.g., Vic., s. 18(1); Tas., s. 15(1); failure to approve infant set-
tlements (e.g., Vic., s. 19A); where a new trial is ordered on the grounds that the
verdict of the jury was against the evidence (e.g., Tas., s. 16(1)).
87 See draft Act, s. 6(3) (a).
38 Id., s. 6(3) (b) and (c).
39 Id., s. 6(4).
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trial and the appeal. Under the proposed scheme, the result would be exactly
the same where an appeal is unsuccessful. Assuming the actual legal ex-
penses incurred by each party on the appeal are $2,000 and the recoverable





Situation after Unsuccessful Appeal
Own Costs Costs Paid Costs Received
$4,000 - $3,000
a1 2,000 - 1,500
4,000 $3,000
2,000 1,500
If Defendant's appeal is successful, then under present practice Plaintiff
would normally be ordered to pay Defendant's party and party costs of both
the trial and appeal. In addition, Plaintiff would have to pay his own costs
incurred at trial and on appeal. It is in this situation-a successful appeal-
that the proposed scheme would alter the costs outcome. Consider the out-
come with and without the proposed indemnity fund:
Situation after Successful Appeal (By Defendant)
(a) Without Indemnity Fund
Own Costs Costs Paid Costs Received
Plaintiff - Trial $4,000 $3,000














It may be seen that with a successful appeal under present practice the
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant are simply reversed from the case of an
unsuccessful appeal by Defendant. However, with the indemnity fund scheme
operating the situation changes if the appeal succeeds. Both Plaintiff and De-
fendant will normally40 recover from the Fund their taxed costs of the ap-





(b) With Indemnity Fund













40 As already indicated, the court has a discretion as to whether to order costs
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The difference is that with the indemnity fund operating the overall
costs of the unsuccessful respondent, Plaintiff, are reduced from $10,500 to
$7,500, that is, by the full amount paid out of the Fund. The costs situation
of Defendant, the successful appellant, are unchanged by the scheme.
Will the operation of the indemnity scheme increase the incidence of
appeals by changing litigants' attitude to the financial risks attending ap-
peals? This question is relevant as increases in the number of appeals may
affect the financial soundness and political acceptability of the scheme. More-
over, since many appellate courts are already working at or near full capa-
city, sound court management calls for some estimate of the likely impact
of the scheme on the workload of the courts.
An analysis of this question indicates that the scheme is unlikely to have
any significant impact on the incidence of appeals. Essentially, it is the ap-
pellant who determines whether there will be an appeal and, since the in-
demnity fund scheme does not change his net cost situation-win or lose-
it offers him no added incentive to appeal. If his appeal is unsuccessful he
will still have to bear his own costs of the appeal and pay his opponent's
party and party appeal costs: the very same result that follows if the scheme
is not in operation. If his appeal is successful he will also be in the same
position as to costs as if he had successfully appealed under the present
practice. He will receive his party and party costs of the appeal, though the
source of those funds will be different from under the present practice.
The only person whose overall financial situation is improved by the
operation of the scheme is the respondent, and then only if the appeal is
successful. When an appeal succeeds, his net cost situation will be better
than under the present practice by an amount equal to both parties' party
and party appeal costs, which will be borne by the Fund rather than by the
respondent. Using the example given above, his overall net costs would be
reduced from $10,500 to $7,500 by the operation of the scheme.
Hence the question is: will this reduction in the net cost situation of a
respondent, if the appeal is successful, likely change his attitude towards the
appeal in a way which would increase the incidence of appeals? The answer
would appear to be negative. Since he is the respondent, ex hypothesi he is
not the one who decides whether the appeal should be initiated. He can,
however, affect whether an appeal ever goes to a hearing by offering to settle
the appeal. The scheme does somewhat reduce his incentive to offer to settle
the appeal, because it reduces his "downside risk" in the event that the
appeal succeeds. Today if the appeal succeeds he will usually be ordered to
pay the appellant's party and party costs and be left to pay his own solicitor
and client appeal costs, while under the indemnity scheme the respondent
will be relieved from paying the successful appellant's costs and will recover
his own party and party appeal costs from the Fund. But it seems unlikely
that this risk reduction will often change his attitude towards settlement,
that is, lead him to decline to settle where under the present situation he
would have settled. By settling he may at least keep some of the "bird in
the hand," that is, his trial judgment; by allowing the appeal to proceed,
with the risk that it will succeed, he may lose it all and be ordered to pay
the appellant's trial costs. In short, considerations other than the appeal costs
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will ultimately determine his decision whether or not to settle the appeal. In
the overall financial picture (that is, the amount of the judgment, plus trial
costs, plus appeal costs) the appeal costs do not loom very large. Even
where the costs of the appeal are likely to be high (because the hearing will
be long and complex) this situation is unlikely to change, as these will al-
most invariably be cases where the judgment under appeal is large and the
trial costs considerably higher than those of the appeal.
The essential point is that the basic deterrent aspect of the cost indemn-
ity system still remains in full force as against the moving party-the ap-
pellant. In making a decision to appeal he will know that, as under the pre-
sent system, unless the appeal succeeds he will be required to pay the re-
spondent's costs.
C. Abortive Proceedings
Various situations can arise where parties incur the costs of a trial or
hearing without having their dispute resolved because, for reasons beyond
their control, the proceedings are aborted before a decision is reached. Ex-
amples are where a jury disagrees and cannot render a verdict, or where the
presiding judge dies before delivering judgment. In such cases, if the parties
wish to continue and to have their dispute resolved judicially, there will
have to be a new trial or a rehearing. A similar situation can arise where
the rendering of a decision is unreasonably delayed and legislation provides
(as in Ontario) 41 that a rehearing may be ordered. In all of these situations,
if the parties elect to proceed with a new trial (rather than to settle) they
should not have to bear the -cost of both hearings and relief should be avail-
able from the Fund.42
Such aborted proceedings are the second category of eligible proceed-
ings under the draft Act. Under section 4, where the initial trial or hearing
fails to produce a result by reason of the disagreement of a jury, the death
of the presiding judge or his failure to render judgment within the time re-
quired by law, and a subsequent trial or hearing is held, then the parties are
entitled to be compensated out of the Fund.43 The costs recoverable in such
cases would be limited to the cost of the aborted hearing itself (that is,
counsel fee at trial and trial disbursements, for example, witness fees) and
would not extend to all the costs of the proceeding, such as pre-trial costs,
for example, pleadings, discovery and preparation for trial. These latter
costs, though incurred for the first trial, are not thrown away and will be
necessary expenditures in respect of the subsequent hearing. The require-
41Pursuant to the Ontario Rules of Practice, Rule 401, the Chief Justice may
order, inter alia, a re-trial or rehearing where a judge has not given judgment within
six months of reserving it.
42 The Australian schemes all provide for indemnity in the event of the presiding
judge dying or being unable to complete a proceeding due to illness: Vic., s. 9A; Q'ld.,
s. 22(1) (a); Tas., s. 15(1) (a); S. Aust., s. 8(a); W. Aust., s. 14(1) (a); N.S.W.,
s. 6A(1) (a). Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia also extend protection to
cases involving disagreement on the part of the jury.
43 Section 4, the abortive proceedings section, also extends to situations where a
mistrial is declared: see text accompanying note 44, infra.
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ment that a subsequent hearing take place before the parties become entitled
to compensation is a necessary one, since the purpose here is to relieve the
parties of the expense of two hearings, not to give them a free hearing
should they decide to settle rather than to hold a new trial. The following
example illustrates the operation of the scheme with respect to abortive pro-
ceedings. In Smith v. Jones the trial judge dies midway through the trial. At
that point each party has incurred party and party costs as follows:
Pretrial costs (for example, pleadings, discovery, $4,000.00
preparation for trial)
Counsel fee at trial 5,000.00
Trial disbursement (for example, witness fees) 500.00
$9,500.00
A new trial is ordered and the parties decide to proceed because they can-
not agree on a settlement. At the conclusion of the new trial the trial judge
will dispose of the costs of that trial in the normal way (for example, judg-
ment for the plaintiff with costs) and he will order that in respect of the
first (abortive) trial each of the parties has their trial costs (that is, $5,500
-the original counsel fee and trial disbursements) from the Fund. The
$4,000 in respect of pre-trial costs will not be paid out of the Fund; rather
they will form part of the costs ordered to be paid by one of the parties
under the cost order covering the new trial. If the parties settle the case and
do not proceed with the new trial they will recover nothing from the Fund.
There is a further, and more problematic, type of abortive proceeding:
the situation in which a mistrial is declared due to the occurrence of certain
events during the course of the trial, for example, the discharge of the jury
because a party or witness spoke to a juror or because of the mention of
insurance or other prejudicial conduct in the presence of the jury. Should
not the court at least have a discretion to order that the costs incurred by
an innocent party in such cases be paid out of the Fund? All six Australian
schemes provide that compensation is payable where a trial is prematurely
terminated for reasons not attributable to the fault of a party. But the sta-
tutes are all typically worded very broadly, that is, they require that the
termination not be due to "the act, neglect or default... of all or any one
or more of the parties thereto or their legal practitioners." While one
writer has suggested that under a provision so worded a court could indemn-
ify an innocent party out of the fund,45 at least one decided case held to the
contrary."6 Under the draft Act, where a mistrial is declared the court would
have a general discretion. Hence, it could consider the degree of responsi-
bility of each party and make an order against the Fund where that was
44See, e.g., Vic., s. 18(1) (c).
45 Supra note 2, at 167.
46 Greaves v. Blackborrow (1960), 78 W.N. (N.S.W.) 517 (S.Ct.). In this case,
the jury was discharged when the plaintiff spoke to a juror, albeit not about the case.
The court declined to order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the abortive
proceedings. It also held it could not make an order against the fund, because the ter-
mination was caused bythe action of a party.
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appropriate, or it could simply order costs to be paid by the party who
caused the mistrial if that were more appropriate.
D. Settlements Requiring Court Approval
Where a person under disability, such as a minor or mental incom-
petent, makes a claim, the settlement or compromise of the claim requires
court approval.47 If the court refuses to approve a proposed settlement the
parties are forced to proceed to trial unless, of course, the defendant im-
proves his offer to the point where the court will approve a settlement. Al-
though it is not a common occurrence, it can happen that at the resulting
trial the disabled plaintiff recovers no more, or even less than, the offer of
settlement which the court refused to approve. When this occurs, it is quite
unfair that the parties should have to bear the costs incurred subsequent to
the court's refusal to approve the proposed settlement. Ex hypothesi, the
parties were content with the proposed settlement. In retrospect it was a
reasonable settlement. The costs incurred in going to trial are attributable
not to any fault on the part of the parties, but solely to the "error" of the
judge in refusing to approve the settlement.
Such cases represent the third category of eligible proceedings under
the draft Act.48 Following the example of the Australian statutes, 49 the draft
Act provides that where a court refuses to approve a proposed settlement of
the claim of a person under disability, and at trial the plaintiff recovers an
amount not greater than he would have received under the rejected settle-
ment, the court may order payment out of the Fund of the costs of the
parties incurred subsequent to the refusal to sanction the compromise, that
is, the costs of that part of the proceedings which was held at the instance
of the court and not the parties.
V. LIMITS ON RECOVERY
A. Amounts
Should there be a ceiling on the amount payable out of the Fund in re-
spect of any given party or proceeding? All of the Australian schemes pro-
vide such limits. Ideally, if otherwise entitled under the draft Act, a litigant
should not find the costs he can recover limited by means of a ceiling. How-
ever, to ensure the solvency of the Fund it is probably wise to provide a
ceiling.60 The ceilings provided in Australian legislation do not provide par-
47See, e.g., New Brunswick Rules of Court 1982 (Reg. 81-174) Rule 7.07; Ont.,
Report of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee (Toronto: Min. of A.G., 1980),
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7.07.
48 Draft Act, s. 5.
49 With the exception of New South Wales, all of the Australian statutes provide
that where a settlement of an action by an infant is rejected by the court and at trial
the infant recovers an amount not greater than he would have recovered under the
settlement, the parties may recover all or part of their costs. Western Australia has
extended this provision to cover all persons under disability. See, Vic., s. 24; Q'ld.,
s. 24; Tas., s. 17; S. Aust., s. 8(d); W. Aust., s. 14B.
50 An alternative might be to provide that the Fund could "re-insure" against the
possibility of a claim being in excess of a given amount. If such re-insurance were
available at reasonable cost, then the draft Act need contain no ceiling on recoverable
costs.
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ticularly meaningful guidelines due to the difference in the costs of the liti-
gation in Canada and Australia.5' The draft Act contains an arbitrary figure 2
of $10,000 as the maximum amount that any one person may be paid in
respect of costs of any one proceeding.
B. Parties
All of the Australian states prohibit the Crown from benefiting under
the scheme.53 This exception seems reasonable on the ground that the scheme
is designed to compensate for costs incurred through the malfunctioning of
an arm of government and hence the government should not be a benefi-
ciary. 4 Section 11(b) of the draft Act excepts the Crown from participation.
In Australia, two states-New South Wales and Western Australia-
make a further exception: they exclude corporations with a paid-up capital
of more than $200,000.00. 5 This exception seems unreasonable. Since the
scheme is one of compulsory insurance for litigants, and not a form of legal
aid, the means of the party should not be relevant to eligibility for compen-
sation. If a party has contributed to the Fund it should be entitled to bene-
fit from it. The draft Act would not exclude any party other than the Crown.
VI. PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION
The draft Act seeks to keep the procedure for operating the scheme as
simple as possible and to make full use of existing procedures. In several
respects it deviates from the Australian model.
When a court decides that costs should be paid out of the Fund to a
party it simply makes an order in favour of that party against the Fund, just
as if the Fund were a party to the proceeding. The Australian approach is
different and involves a two step procedure. For example, in the case of a
successful appeal, the court first makes its order for costs as between the
parties, that is, the successful appellant is usually given his costs as against
the respondent. The respondent then applies to the court for an order against
the Fund covering both his own appeal costs and those that he has been
ordered to pay and that he has actually paid.56 This approach involves
51 The most recent legislation, passed in South Australia in 1979, restricts the total
amount payable to a party in respect of an appeal (including any previous appeal) to
Australian $5,000 or approximately Canadian $6,350, at present exchange rates.
Draft Act, s. 10. To allow flexibility it is provided that some other figure may
be prescribed by regulation. A guideline for fixing a real, as opposed to an arbitrary,
figure, is that it should be at least equal to the average taxed costs of an appeal. The
draft Act or a regulation could go further and provide different ceilings for appeals,
abortive proceedings and cases where the court refused to approve a settlement.
53 N.S.W., s. 6(7); S. Aust., s. 10(2); W. Aust., s. 13(3); Vic., s. 17(3); Tas.,
s. 19(2); Q'ld., s. 21(3).
54 However, it can also be argued that if the Crown contributed to the scheme
through the payment of court fees there is no reason why it should not benefit from
what is, in fact, an insurance scheme. But in Ontario at least, the Crown does not pre-
sently pay court filing fees.
55 N.S.W., s. 6(7); W. Aust., s. 13(3).
56 See, e.g., Suitors' Fund (Amendment) Act, 1960 (No. 8 of 1960, N.S.W.), s.
2(b) (ii).
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rather obvious difficulties which have necessitated statutory amendments
adding "hardship clauses" permitting payment directly to the appellant in
certain instances,17 for example, where the respondent is unable to pay the
costs of the appellant, refuses or neglects to do so, or just cannot be found.
The Australian double step, "flow through" method, appears to have no ad-
vantages and carries with it considerable difficulties. Consequently the draft
Act provides for an order to be made directly against the Fund in favour of
all parties eligible for compensation.
An order for costs against the Fund will normally be for the party and
party costs of the relevant proceedingr 8 The party receiving such an order
would simply tax the costs and recover the taxed costs from the Fund.
In each of three Australian states-Victoria, Queensland and Western
Australia-there is an Appeal Costs Board responsible for administering the
fund. When a court grants an indemnity certificate in respect of a proceed-
ing, the Appeal Costs Board acts almost as a check on the court: the Board
is required to be satisfied that any payment out of the fund is authorized by
the legislation. Legislative history in Victoria indicates concern that in other
states "courts were a little loose in giving their certificates and did not com-
ply with the requirements of the Act." 59 Hence some states have created
Boards as "watchdogs" over the fund. While several Australian states have
a mechanism for scrutinizing the courts' indemnity certificates, some moni-
toring on a regular basis may be useful. However, a less complex mechanism
than a Board seems preferable. The draft Act provides, in section 7, that a
court which grants an order against the Fund shall give notice of that order
to the Attorney-General. Within three weeks of the order being made the
Attorney-General may apply to the court to review the order. If the At-
torney-General is not satisfied with the court's review of the order he may
appeal the review to the Court of Appeal. This procedure ensures that there
will be a mechanism for reviewing orders against the Fund while maintaining
ultimate control of the payment in the hands of the court rather than a gov-
ernment board. Notice to the Attorney-General is given by the court, rather
than by a party, to ensure a standardized procedure. The notice must give
sufficient information about the order so that the Attorney-General may
determine whether he should apply for review. A party in whose favour the
order is made will be entitled to appear on review.
In all of the Australian states the grant or refusal of an indemnity
certificate is at the sole discretion of the court and no right of appeal is pro-
57Legal Assistance and Suitors' Fund (Amendment) Act, 1970 (No. 10 of 1970,
N.S.W.), s. 3(1) (c) (ii). See also Tas., s. 9(2); Q'Id., s. 16; W. Aust., s. 11(1); Vic.,
s. 14(2).
58 This is the most generous award that can be made: see draft Act, s. (6)2. Where
appropriate a court may make a less generous order, for example, it could be restricted
to cover only part of the proceeding or it could be restricted to a percentage of taxed
costs: see draft Act, s. 6(3).
59 State of Vic. Legis. Council Deb. March 25, 1964, at 3383 (R.J. Hamer, Minister
of Immigration).
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vided. ° It is desirable to have some limited right of appeal, especially in
cases where a certificate has been refused by a lower court. Such a right of
appeal could help to encourage uniformity in the criteria used by courts
when granting certificates. In a recent Australian case, a litigant tried to
appeal a judge's refusal to grant an indemnity certificate. The Court of Ap-
peal of New South Wales held that no such appeal was available, but sug-
gested that there were some problems in having no means of appeal. The
court proposed that "[s]ome consideration be given to amend the Act to
provide for an appeal to this Court by leave, limited in appropriate terms
to exceptional cases, so that this Court can ensure uniformity."'61
Section 8 of the draft Act provides that an appeal may be brought with
leave of the Court of Appeal from the grant or refusal of an order against
the Fund. This is the litigant's only means of appeal related to an order
against the Fund. In practice, the Court of Appeal should probably restrict
appeals under that section to cases of wide application or gross error by the
first court.
The administration of the Fund would be relatively simple. The Fund
would be vested in the Accountant of the Supreme Court and managed by
him in the same manner that money paid into court is managed. Payments
into the Fund would be made from court fees, the funds would be invested
and money would be paid out pursuant to the order of a judge and the certi-
ficate of the taxing officer.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
A. Appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada
Ideally, to be fully comprehensive, the scheme should extend to ap-
peals from provincial appellate courts to the Supreme Court of Canada.
However, the Australian experience and existing Canadian law indicate that
there may be constitutional difficulties in making the plan applicable to that
court.
The first problem is that the legislation might be considered inconipe-
tent to a province as being legislation in relation to the Supreme Court.
However, since the scheme does not apply solely to appeals to the Supreme
Court this problem is not likely to be serious. The second problem concerns
the procedure by which an order against the Fund would be granted in re-
spect of an appeal to the Supreme Court. Difficulties will result if the legisla-
60 See, e.g., N.S.W., s. 6(5).
61 Cordell v. Goodwin, [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 417 at 419 (C.A.), per Moffitt J.
62 Laws in relation to the Supreme Court of Canada are within exclusive federal
jurisdiction under section 101 of the British North America Act, 1867. Cf. Crown
Grain Co. v. Day, [1908] A.C. 504 (P.C.), where The Mechanics' and Wage Earners'
Lien Act, R.S.M. 1902, c. 110, s. 36 provided that in suits relating to liens, the judg-
ment of the Manitoba Court of King's Bench "shall be final and binding, and no appeal
shall lie therefrom." The Privy Council held that the provincial Act could not circum-
scribe the appellate jurisdiction granted to the Parliament of Canada by s. 101 of the
B.N.A. Act, even where the subject matter of litigation is in the sphere of legislation
allocated to the provincial Legislatures.
1981]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
tion attempts to give the Supreme Court of Canada jurisdiction to grant an
order against the Fund. Such an attempt by a provincial legislature to confer
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court would likely be ultra vires. The Canadian
case law on the subject of the Supreme Court and provincial attempts to
alter its jurisdiction is, not surprisingly, entirely composed of attempts by
provinces to restrict that jurisdiction. However, in at least two cases where
it struck down such attempts, the Supreme Court stated that an attempt by
a province to add to the courts jurisdiction would also be invalid.0
In Australia, the original New South Wales legislation provided simply
that the court determining the appeal could grant an indemnity certificate.0
A trilogy of cases in the mid-1950s made it clear that the Suitors' Fund Act
provided no assistance to litigants once an appeal went beyond the state
courts. 5 In Commissioner for Stamp Duties v. Owens 0 the High Court al-
lowed an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respon-
dent to the appeal applied to the High Court for an indemnity certificate.
The High Court held that the Act did not give it the power to grant a certi-
ficate and that an attempt to give it that power would have been invalid.
In Selby Shoes (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Erickson 7 the Supreme Court of New
South Wales held that it could not grant a certificate in respect of an appeal
to the High Court. Finally, in Gurnett v. Macquarie Stevedoring and Light-
erage8 the High Court stated that it could not grant a certificate in respect
of the costs of the appeal up to the state Supreme Court.
As a result of these decisions the New South Wales legislation was
amended in 1959. Now all of the Australian statutes provide that the state
Supreme Court may grant a certificate in respect of an appeal beyond the
state courts, that is, to the High Court of Australia or the Privy Council.
Similarly, section 3(3) of the draft Act provides that where the Supreme
Court of Canada decides a successful appeal, any party to the proceeding
may apply to a judge of the provincial Supreme Court for an order against
the Fund.
B. Series of Appeals
How should indemnity from the Fund be dealt with where there is a
series of appeals; for example, where a successful appeal is taken from a
decision at first instance to an intermediate appellate court and subsequently
a further successful appeal is taken to another court which reinstates the
decision at first instance?
The first issue raised by this scenerio is whether, given that the decision
63 Halifax v. McLaughlin Carriage Co. (1907), 39 S.C.R. 174 at 183; L'Ass'n. St.
Jean-Baptiste de Montrial v. Brault (1901), 31 S.C.R. 172 at 174.
6 N.S.W., s. 6(1).
65 The possibility of constitutional problems with this aspect of the legislation was
recognized during debate, see NS.W. Legis. Council Deb. May 15, 1951, at 1929-30.
06 (1953), 88 C.L.R. 168 (H.C. of Aust.).
87 (1956), 73 W.N. (N.S.W.) 116 (S.Ct.).
68 (1956), 95 C.L.R. 106 (H.C. of Aust.).
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at first instance was ultimately upheld, any indemnity should be payable out
of the Fund? One Australian case has suggested that no indemnity at all
should be payable in such a case.6 It is submitted that this result and the
reasoning employed is unacceptable. It gives weight only to the ultimate out-
come (the upholding of the initial decision) and overlooks the costly pro-
cess by which the court system achieved that result. In such a case it will
have taken the system three hearings to get the correct result and the parties
should only have to pay for one hearing. The Fund should be liable for the
costs of the first appeal because it was a successful appeal. Similarly, the
Fund should also be liable for the costs of the second appeal reversing the
"incorrect" decision of the intermediate appellate court.
A second issue raised by successive appeals relates to the timing for
payment made from the Fund. Should the parties be entitled to payment out
of the Fund in respect of the appeal to the intermediate court while they
are pursuing, or could still pursue, a further appeal? The Australian statutes
contain provisions postponing such payments out of the fund to ensure that
the payments are not used to finance further appeals, that is, an order against
the fund is automatically stayed by the commencement of a subsequent ap-
peal. 71 While an argument can be made for a contrary rule, on balance, the
Australian approach to this issue seems a wise one: the immediate payment
of benefits out of the fund may well encourage second level appeals. Hence,
section 9(4) of the draft Act provides that no payments may be made out
of the Fund until the time for appeal or for seeking leave to appeal has ex-
pired, and that the order for payment is stayed by obtaining leave or by
launching a subsequent appeal.
A third issue raised by successive appeals regards the operation of the
scheme where the decision at first instance is affirmed on appeal but is then
reversed on a subsequent appeal, for example the Court of Appeal upholds
the trial court but is then reversed on a further appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. In such a case, the court system malfunctions not once, but
twice, and prima facie the party should only have to bear the costs of the
initial trial. Section 3 of the draft Act provides that in such a case the court
may order that the parties recover against the Fund not only the costs of the
ultimately successful appeal, but also the costs of any unsuccessful interme-
diate appeal. It is also provided that when an appeal succeeds, the court
may include in an order against the Fund the cost of any motion for leave
to appeal.
C. Judicial Discretion
As already indicated, the draft Act adopts the approach of giving the
court a discretion to order costs against the Fund in respect of eligible pro-
ceedings, rather than giving the party a right to costs. The intention is that,
normally, both parties to an eligible proceeding should be given an order
69 Pataky v. Utah Construction & Engineering Ply. Ltd., [19661 1 N.S.W.R. 689,
84 W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 201 (S.Ct.).
70 See, e.g., S. Aust., s. 7(6).
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against the Fund for their party and party costs. But in respect of any of
the eligible proceedings cases may arise where this is not appropriate. Con-
sequently, unlike many of the Australian statutes, 7' the draft Act gives the
court a general discretion in all cases.
The draft Act contains two provisions specifically dealing with the
court's discretion. Section 6(3) authorizes orders in favour of only some of
the parties or limited to only part of an eligible proceeding or restricted to
only a proportion of the taxed costs of the eligible proceeding. 72 Section
6(4) directs the court to consider the conduct of a party or that of his coun-
selr3 and, in respect of partially successful appeals, the degree of success.
Neither of these provisions is unusual and they involve matters which can
and are taken into account today in awarding costs between parties. Sit-
uations where the misconduct of counsel might be a relevant factor to be
considered can be envisaged, such as the deliberate adducing of inadmissible
evidence before a jury causing a mistrial. 74 More problematic is what weight
is to be given to the "misconduct" of counsel who leads a court into error
through his submissions, thus causing a successful appeal. This has been
discussed in the Australian case law75 and the cases have been distinguished
between submissions that "should not have been made," that is, submissions
that either deliberately or through negligence on the part of the lawyer mis-
led the court (justifying the refusal of an order against the fund) and "un-
successful submissions," that is, those which are arguable but ultimately un-
successful (and which do not disentitle a party to an order against the fund).
D. Financial Viability of the Scheme
Is the scheme proposed here one that can be financially viable? Illus-
trative data, developed in the Ontario context, indicates that relatively small
increases in court fees would produce a substantial Fund, one that would be
71 Some of the Australian statutes (e.g., Vic., Tas., and Q'ld.) give a party a right
to costs against the fund in some situations, such as abortive proceedings, cases where
the court refused to sanction infant settlement or where a new trial is ordered on the
ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. In all of
the six states, however, relief is discretionary where the proceeding involved was a suc-
cessful appeal on a question of law.
72 This power to make a limited order in favour of a party, for example, for only
half of his costs, is absent from five of the six Australian schemes. Only in South
Australia does the legislation give the court power to specify the extent of the certifi-
cate: see S. Aust., ss. 7(2), 8(1). In one New South Wales case the court commented:
"[o]ne would have thought the scheme more workable if the discretion extended to
limiting... that portion of the costs of any appeal to which the certificate was to
apply." Acquilina, supra note 34, at 777 (N.S.W.R.), 537 (W.N.) (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.).
73 All the Australian schemes deny recovery, in certain cases, whenever there is a
misconduct by any party or counsel: see text accompanying note 44, supra.
74 However, given that this type of trial decision is one over which the client has
virtually no control, quaere whether such conduct should deprive the party of access to
the Fund, unless the court is prepared to make an order requiring counsel to personally
bear the party's costs?
7 5 See, e.g., Di Battista v. Motion, [1971] V.R. 565 (S.Ct. Full Ct.); McLennan
v. McBroom, [1969] V.R. 566 (S.Ct. Full Ct.); Zappulla v. Perkins (No. 2), "19781 Qd.
R. 401 (S.Ct. Full Ct.); Builders Licensing Bd., supra note 25.
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su'fficient to meet likely claims. The following table"6 reveals the amount of
revenue that could be generated by increasing the fees payable77 in the
Supreme and County Courts in Ontario:
No. of Cases Fee Increase Additional Revenue
Supreme Court
Proceedings Commenced 54,868 $ 5.00* $274,340
Appearance (27,434)78 5.00** 137,170
Set Down for Trial 6,539 10.00"** 65,390
County Court
Proceedings Commenced 71,923 5.00* 359,615
Appearance (26,866)78 5.00** 134,330
Set Down for Trial 29,09279 10.00*** 290,920
$1,261,765
*from $30 to $35
*from $15 to $20
**'from $40 to $50
Hence it can be seen that by modest increases in only the fees payable
in the Supreme and County Courts an annual fund of some $1.26 million
would be produced. If small increases were made in the fees payable in
other courts (for example, the Surrogate Courts,80 which had 27,716 appli-
cations in 1978-79 and the Small Claims Courts, 81 which had 159,321 cases
filed in 1980) substantially greater revenue would be generated in the Fund.
What of payments out of the Fund? In 1979 the Court of Appeal of
Ontario allowed 166 appeals.82 If orders against the fund in each of these
cases averaged $5,000, the total of payments out would be $830,000, leaving
$431,765 remaining to meet the cost of successful interlocutory appeals and
appeals to courts other than to the Court of Appeal, and abortive proceed-
ings.
76 Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General, Court Statistics Annual Report
1980/81, 1978/79 court statistics.
77 The present fees are those prescribed by 0. Reg. 517/80, made pursuant to the
Administration of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 6.
78 This figure as to the number of appearances (that is, defences) entered is the
authors' rough estimate. It is based on the fact that the court statistics indicate that
in County Court about half of all actions commenced end in default judgment, suggest-
ing that in the other half at least an appearance is entered.
791Te figure for the number of cases set down for trial appears to be much higher
in County Courts than in the Supreme Court because the Court Statistics report di-
vorces which are destined to be disposed of by County Court judges sitting as local
judges of the Supreme Court, as being commenced in the Supreme Court but set down
for trial in the County Court.
80 Supra note 76.
81 Figure provided by Ronald McFarland, Director of Small Claims Court, Ontario
Ministry of the Attorney-General.
82 This figure was supplied by W.F. Shaughnessey, Registrar of the Court of Ap-
peal. The court statistics, see, supra note 76, indicate that in 1978-79, 473 civil appeals
were argued before the Court of Appeal. Most appeals came from the Supreme and
County Courts.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The litigation insurance scheme, as proposed in this paper,83 would
serve to protect litigants from costs that they presently incur through no
fault of their own. It would reduce the burden on the costs of successful
appeals and certain other proceedings.
The proposal is fair to all litigants in that it protects them from the
costs of errors made by the court system. If the scheme were implemented a
party could expect only to pay the costs of "doing things once," that is, the
costs that would have been incurred had no judicial error been made. Since
this amount is what litigants expect to pay in a normal case, it cannot be
claimed that the scheme would tend to encourage a great deal of new litiga-
tion.
The institution of this litigation insurance plan could be accomplished
without an increase in public spending and without setting up any new
agency of government. The scheme would not require the adoption of any
new principles for determining costs.
83 There is a further, possible extension of the schemes which has not been in-
corporated into the draft Act. This would be to allow for orders against the Fund to
compensate parties for the cost of unsuccessful appeals, where the appeal decided a
question of law that had previously been unclear. The rationale would be that if neither
party could be particularly certain of success on the appeal, then both acted reasonably
in either pursuing or not settling the appeal. The extension would recognize the interest
of all litigants in having the law clarified and thus removing the need for a later appeal
or trial. On such an extension see Gower, The Cost of Litigation (1954), 17 Mod. L.
Rev. 1 and Final Report of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure
(Evershed Committee) (Cmd. 8878, 1953) Section IX.
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APPENDIX-DRAFT ACT
This draft Act assumes an Ontario court and legislative structure. With
suitable modifications it could be enacted by any Canadian jurisdiction.
LITIGANT'S INDEMNITY FUND ACT
INTERPRETATION
1. In this Act, unless a contrary intention appears,
(a) "appeal" includes a cross-appeal and an application by way of a
stated case.
(b) "court" means
(i) a Small Claims Court
(ii) a Provincial Court (Civil Division)
(iii) a Provincial Court (Family Division)
(iv) a County or District Court
(v) a Surrogate Court
(vi) a Unified Family Court
(vii) the Supreme Court, including the Divisional Court, and
(viii) the Court of Appeal,
and includes an officer of a court.
(c) "court fees" means any fees payable to a court in respect of the
initiation of a proceeding, the taking of any step in a proceeding
or the filing of any documents in a proceeding.
(d) "fund" means the litigants indemnity fund established under this
Act.
THE FUND
2. (1) For the purpose of this Act, there shall be a fund entitled the
"Litigant's Indemnity Fund."
(2) The fund shall be vested in and managed by the Accountant of
the Supreme Court.
(3) The fund shall consist of
(a) money paid into the fund pursuant to this Act, and
(b) all interest that accrues from investment of the fund.
(4) The Attorney-General may appropriate from the fund such money
as is necessary to meet the expense of managing the fund.
(5) There shall be paid into the fund, at times determined by the At-
torney-General, an amount equal to such proportions of the reve-
nue derived from court fees as may be prescribed by regulation.
3. (1) Where an appeal from the decision of a court in a civil proceeding
succeeds in whole or in part, an order may be made that the costs
of the appeal of any party, are, to the extent specified in the order,
payable out of the fund.
(2) An order under sub-section (1) may also provide that any party
shall recover from the fund, to the extent specified in the order,
19811
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
(a) the costs of any previous appeal in the same case before a
lower appellate court, and
(b) the costs of any motion for leave to appeal.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), an order under subsection (1) may be
made by the court hearing the appeal.
(4) Where an appeal referred to in subsection (1) is heard by the
Supreme Court of Canada any party to the proceeding may apply
to a judge of the Supreme Court for an order under subsection (1).
(5) Where the judgment on an appeal referred to in subsection (1) di-
rects a new trial or hearing, the court conducting the new trial or
hearing may order that the costs of the original or the new trial
or hearing, whichever is less, of any party are, to the extent speci-
fied in the order, payable out of the fund.
COSTS OF ABORTIVE PROCEEDINGS
4. (1) Where the trial or hearing of a civil proceeding is rendered abor-
tive by
(a) the disagreement of the jury,
(b) the declaration of a mistrial,
(c) the death of the judge or other presiding officer prior to the
delivery of judgment, or
(d) the failure of the judge or other presiding officer to deliver
judgment within the period prescribed by the Judicature Act,
including any extension granted thereto,
the court in which the proceeding was commenced may order that
the costs of such trial or hearing of any party are, to the extent
specified in the order, payable out of the fund.
(2) No order shall be made in respect of a proceeding referred to in
sub-section (1) unless there is a subsequent trial or hearing of the
proceeding.
COSTS WHERE COURT REFUSES TO APPROVE COMPROMISE
5. Where in a proceeding brought by a party under disability the court
refuses to sanction a proposed compromise and at the trial or hearing
the amount recovered by the plaintiff does not exceed the amount the
defendant offered to pay under the compromise, the court in which the
proceeding was commenced may order. the costs of any party
(a) incurred subsequent to the refusal of the court to approve the
compromise, and
(b) to the extent specified in the order,
payable from the fund.
ORDERS AGAINST THE FUND
6. (1) An order against the fund shall be made, in the same manner as
an order against a party, except as otherwise provided in this Act
or by regulation.
(2) An order against the fund shall not provide for payment out of
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the fund of any more than would be allowable on a party and
party taxation in respect of the proceeding, trial or hearing in
question.
(3) In granting or refusing to grant an order against the fund the
court may
(a) determine in favour of which parties, if any, to make the
order, and
(b) restrict the order to the costs of part of the proceeding, or
(c) restrict the order to a proportion of the taxed costs.
(4) In granting or refusing to grant an order against the fund or in
determining the nature and extent of that order, the court may take
into account
(a) the conduct of the party in whose favour the order is sought
and the conduct of that party's legal counsel, and
(b) where an appeal succeeds only in part, the degree of success.
REVIEW OF ORDER AGAINST FUND ON MOTION OF THE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
7. (1) The court making an order against the fund shall give notice of
the order to the Attorney-General within 7 days of making the
order. '
(2) The Attorney-General may, with notice to the party in whose fa-
vour the order against the fund was made, apply to the court that
made the order to have the order reviewed by that court, and the
Attorney-General shall make such application within 21 days of
date of the order.
(3) On an application to review an order the court may confirm, vary
or set aside the order.
(4) An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney-General
from the decision of any other court on an application to review
under this section.
(5) On appeal under sub-section (4) any party in whose favour an
order against the fund was, or might have been made, shall be
entitled to appear.
APPEAL OF ORDER
8. (1) An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, with leave of that court,
from the grant or refusal of an order against the fund by any other
court.
(2) The Attorney-General is entitled to notice of any application for
leave to appeal or of any appeal under this section.
TAXATION AND PAYMENT OUT OF THE FUND
9. (1) A party shall be entitled to payment out of the fund upon pre-
sentation to the Accountant of the Supreme Court of
(a) an order of a court directing such payment, and
(b) the certificate of a taxing officer as to the amount of the costs.
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(2) The taxation of costs payable out of the fund shall be on notice
to the Attorney-General.
(3) In taxing costs payable out of the fund the taxing officer shall
allow a party such costs as were reasonably incurred in respect of
(a) the taxation, and
(b) any review of the order or appeal of the order under section
7, unless otherwise ordered.
(4) An order for costs against the fund is stayed
(a) during the time in which the appeal may be taken from the
decision in the proceeding in which the order against the
fund was made,
(b) during the time in which an application for review may be
made under section 7(2) or an appeal may be taken under
section 7(4) or section 8(1), and
(c) pending the disposition of any such appeal or review, as the
case may be.
LIMITATIONS
10. No person shall be paid, in respect of an order against the fund under
this Act, more than $10,000 or such other sum as is prescribed by
regulation.
11. No order shall be made against the fund
(a) in respect of a proceeding commenced before the date upon which
this Act comes into force, or
(b) in favour of the Crown or any agency thereof.
ADVANCES TO THE FUND
12. Where the amount of the fund is or is expected to become inadequate
to meet the orders made against it, an advance to the fund may be
made from Consolidated Revenue on such terms as may be prescribed
by regulation.
REGULATIONS
13. The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations regarding
any matter referred to in this Act as being the subject of regulations,
and for generally carrying the Act into effect, including
(a) prescribing the percentage of court fees from any court to be paid
into the fund,
(b) the maximum amount that may be paid to a party under an order
against the fund,
(c) the procedure to be followed under the Act.
COMMENCEMENT
14. This Act comes into force on a date to be proclaimed.
SHORT TITLE
15. The short title of this Act is the Litigant's Indemnity Fund Act.
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